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The North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation After Ten Years:
Lessons About Institutional Structure and
Public Participation in Governance
DAVID L. MARKELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
A little more than ten years ago the three North American
countries, Canada, Mexico, and the United States, adopted the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 1 Supporters of "free
trade"-i.e., in this context proponents of the reduced trade barriers and
enhanced investment protection that NAFTA would produce-were
optimistic about the benefits that liberalized trade would bring to the
people of the continent.2 Invigorated domestic economies (greater
investment, more jobs, etc.) were among the hoped-for outcomes of this
landmark regional trade agreement for North America. 3
Others were concerned that reducing trade barriers would not be a
panacea. They worried that, instead, it might have adverse impacts on
environmental protection and on the interests of labor.4 Some members
. Steven M. Goldstein Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Thanks are due
to Professors Greg Block, John Knox, Kal Raustiala, and Chris Wold for reviewing earlier
versions of this article. Thanks also to Danielle Appignani, FSU College of Law '05, and Sarah
Lindquist, FSU College of Law '06, for excellent research assistance.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 11, 14, and 17, 1992, 32 LL.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 5-6 (Daniel Magraw ed.,
Section of International Law and Practice, American Bar Association 1995) [hereinafter NAFTA
& THE ENVIRONMENT].
3. Pierre Marc Johnson & Andre Beaulieu, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA:
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 9-17 (Island Press 1996).
4. See id. at 8, 15, 26-29; GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 3 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox, eds., Stanford University
Press 2003) [hereinafter GREENING NAFTA]; NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2, at 3-
5.
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of these constituencies no doubt also were less than sanguine about the
efficacy and adequacy of existing domestic governance efforts in
serving environmental protection and labor interests. 5
Concerns about the adequacy of environmental and labor
protection efforts, particularly in a world of liberalized trade, had a
significant outcome on the NAFTA negotiations. Environmental and
other interests had sufficient domestic political leverage, especially in
the United States, to secure the adoption, simultaneously with the
adoption of NAFTA, of two companion agreements, the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). 6 Without
the support of these NGOs it is not clear whether any of the Agreements
would have attracted enough political support to win Congressional
approval.7
The debate continues today about whether the creation of these
new environmental and labor institutions as part of the "NAFTA
package" was a pyrrhic or real victory (or a counter-productive intrusion
into the signatory Parties' domestic governance prerogatives), and
concerning how best to balance the objective of liberalizing trade in
North America with concerns about environmental and labor protection
on the continent.8 Debate similarly continues about how best to navigate
trade, environment, and labor issues in the context of the multitude of
trade-related agreements that have been negotiated in recent years and
in the context of those that remain in negotiation. The United States
alone, for example, in the past few years has negotiated "free trade"
5. See Johnson & Beaulieu, supra note 3, at 15-7; GREENING NAFTA, supra note 4, at 4-5.
6. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Dec. 8, 11, 14, and 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]; North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC]; see GREENING NAFTA, supra note 4, at 7-
9; Johnson & Beaulieu, supra note 3, at 24-34.
7. See GREENING NAFTA, supra note 4, at 12-3 (noting that, "[i]n at least one respect, the
NAAEC was undoubtedly successful.... [I]t helped to attract support for NAFTA in the U.S.
Congress, which approved NAFTA and its accompanying agreements in November 1993.");
Johnson & Beaulieu, supra note 3, at 24. The governments' willingness to create these
companion institutions created a schism in the environmental community. Some environmental
non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) came on board to support the NAFTA package (e.g.,
the National Wildlife Foundation and the World Wildlife Foundation), while others maintained
their role in opposition to NAFTA (e.g., the Sierra Club and many other groups from Mexico and
Canada). GREENING NAFTA, supra note 4, at 10; Johnson & Beaulieu, supra note 3, at 31-34.
8. Concerns about the merits of liberalizing trade, and the types of such liberalization that
are appropriate, beyond environmental and labor issues, continue today as well, but these are for a
different day and forum.
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agreements with countries such as Singapore (2004),9 Morocco
(2004),1" Chile (2003),11 and Jordan (2000).12 Significant free trade
negotiations that are ongoing include the Free Trade of the Americas
Agreement (FTAA) discussions, 13 and draft agreements with Central
American nations in the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA) 14 and, more recently, with the Dominican Republic. 15
With ten years of implementation experience, the respective track
records of the North American Environmental and Labor Agreements,
and the performance of the new, regional institutions they spawned,
obviously provide fertile soil for exploring questions about the trade,
environment, and labor nexus, and about how best to promote
environmental and labor protection.1 6 The decision of the Loyola
International and Comparative Law Review to provide a forum for
consideration of these issues is a welcome one, particularly since there
have been surprisingly few initiatives to include analyses in the same
setting of the different Agreements in the NAFTA package and of the
institutions they established. 17 I am honored to have been asked to
participate in this effort and am delighted to have the opportunity to do
SO.
9. Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, U.S.-Sing., art. 15.1, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore-FTA/Final-Texts/Section-Index.ht
ml [hereinafter U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement].
10. Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States-Morocco Free Trade
Agreement, June 15, 2004, at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/
Flnal_Text/SectionIndex.html.
11. Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile, art. 10.27, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Chile-FTA/Final-Texts/Section-Index.html
[hereinafter U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement].
12. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 (2002).
13. Free Trade of the Americas Eighth Ministerial Meeting, Miami, Florida (Nov. 23, 2003),
available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Ministerials/Miami/Miami-e.asp. The author participated in
a panel during the America's Trade and Sustainable Development Forum that occurred in Miami
in November 2003 during the Miami Trade Ministerial.
14. Office of the United States Trade Representatives, Draft of Central American Free Trade
Agreement, Jan. 28, 2004, available at http://www.natlaw.com/treaties/cafta/caftaenglish.htm.
15. Office of the United States Trade Representatives, Central America - Dominican
Republic - United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, at http://www.ustr.gov/
Trade Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA-DR/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/Section_Index.html.
16. For a sampling of some of the more significant questions in the environmental protection
context, see David Markell, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Citizen
Submission Process, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 545, 568-574 (2000).
17. For one source that contains analyses of different NAFTA Agreements, see Linking
Trade, Environment, and Social Cohesion: NAFTA Experiences, Global Challenges (John J.
Kirton & Virginia W. Maclaren eds., 2002).
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My focus in this article is on the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation and the institution it creates, the North
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). Part II
provides an overview of the structure of the CEC, a feature of the
institution that I believe deserves particular attention. Part III reviews,
from various perspectives, the role that the CEC holds out for the public
to play in environmental governance. Three of the articles in this
volume, those by Professors John Knox, 18 Kal Raustiala, 19 and Chris
Wold,2° focus primarily on this set of issues and are discussed in this
Part. Public participation in governance is currently an issue of
enormous importance and interest, on the world and domestic stages.2'
The Knox, Raustiala, and Wold articles contain important insights that
will help to inform consideration of these issues. Part IV reviews some
of the issues that relate to the impacts of trade on the environment. It
does so primarily through the lens that Professor Greg Block offers in
his article in this issue.22 Concerns about potential trade-related impacts
on the environment provided an important motivating force for the
creation of the NAAEC,23 and continue to be the focus of substantial
interest and attention throughout the world. 4 The Conclusion contains
some final observations.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE CEC
The NAAEC creates, and creates important roles for, three main
sets of actors. As is the case for virtually all international agreements,
considerable power is given to a body that represents the signatory
18. John H. Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American Agreements on Labor and the
Environment, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 359 (2004).
19. Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 LOy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 389 (2004).
20. Chris Wold et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process ofArticles 14 & 15
of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 26 LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 415 (2004).
21. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 596, 619 (1999); Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 16 n.42, 17
nn.43-44 (1997); IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 174-75 (1997).
22. Greg Block, The North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation and the
Environmental Effects of NAFTA: A Decade of Lessons Learned and Where They Leave Us, 26
LOy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 445 (2004).
23. GREENING NAFTA, supra note 4, at 256.
24. Id.
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* 25countries. In the CEC context, this body is known as the CEC
Council. 26 The Council is comprised of the environment ministers of the
three signatory Parties - the U.S. EPA Administrator (currently Michael
Leavitt) and his counterparts in Mexico and Canada.27 The Council has
overall responsibility for implementation of the Agreement. 8 Thus, for
example, while the CEC Secretariat annually prepares draft program
plans and budgets, the Council vets these drafts and retains final
approval authority.29
The NAAEC does not vest exclusive authority in the Council, and
it is here that the Agreement is quite innovative in the institutional
structure it establishes. 30 The NAAEC also establishes as an integral
part of the administration of the CEC a citizens' body known as the Joint
Public Advisory Committee (JPAC). 31 The NAAEC gives the JPAC,
comprised of fifteen citizens (five from each of the North American
countries),32 broad discretion to "provide advice to the Council on any
matter within the scope of the Agreement." 33 In serving this function,
JPAC is intended to operate as the representative of the North American
public.
In addition to the JPAC, the NAAEC reserves a more significant
role for the Secretariat than is the case for the Secretariats of many
international institutions. In Article 13, the NAAEC empowers the CEC
Secretariat to "prepare a report for the Council on any matter within the
scope of the annual program. 34 Under this Article the Secretariat also
may prepare a report on "any other environmental matter related to the
cooperative functions of the Agreement," so long as it notifies the
Council in advance and the Council does not veto preparation of such a
25. GREENING NAFTA, supra note 4, at 9, 11, 25-6.
26. NAAEC Art. 8; GREENING NAFTA, supra note 4, at 9.
27. See NAAEC Art. 9; See GREENING NAFTA, supra note 4, at 9.
28. NAAEC Art. 10; GREENING NAFTA, supra note 4, at 10-1.
29. As is discussed in more detail infra, the Council's authority is less absolute in the
context of the Secretariat's exercise of its responsibilities under Articles 13 and 14-15 than it is in
the context of the Council's review and approval of CEC Secretariat-generated program plans.
30. NAAEC Arts. 8-16; See Greening NAFTA, supra note 4, at 11-12.
31. Greening NAFTA, supra note 4, at 21.
32. NAAEC Art. 16.
33. Id.; Greening NAFTA, supra note 4, at 199. For an in-depth review of the JPAC, see
John Wirth, Perspectives on the Joint Public Advisory Committee, in GREENING NAFTA, supra
note 4, at 199. The scope of the Agreement itself is virtually unlimited. As a result, the JPAC's
ability to provide advice is equally uncircumscribed.
34. NAAECArt. 13.
2004]
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report.35 Thus, Article 13 gives discretion to the Secretariat to tackle
environmental challenges on the continent that it concludes are
important and worthy of in-depth attention, even in the absence of
consensus by the Parties on the propriety of studying such issues.While
there are some constraints on the scope of the Secretariat's discretion, in
practice, the Secretariat's flexibility to identify issues of its choosing has
been considerable. To date, the Secretariat has prepared four reports
under its Article 13 authority and has a fifth underway.
36
Perhaps even more significantly, in Articles 14 and 15, the
NAAEC empowers the Secretariat to play a central role in
administering the CEC's citizen submissions process, an innovative
process that allows citizens of any of the North American countries to
file submissions in which they allege that any of the three countries is
failing to enforce its environmental laws effectively. 37 As Professors
Knox and Raustiala point out in their respective articles in this issue,38
this authority, which includes vesting in the Secretariat considerable
discretion to make judgments about implementation of the citizen
35. NAAEC Art. 13, sec. 1. The Council must exercise its veto within thirty days. It may do
so by a two-thirds vote; unanimity is not required. Id.
36. Chris Wold, Sanford Gaines & Greg M. Block, Trade & Environment (Carolina Press
forthcoming 2005) (on file with the author). For an assessment of the Article 13 report concerning
the San Pedro River Basin, entitled Ribbon of Life: An Agenda for Preserving Transboundary
Migratory Bird Habitat on the Upper San Pedro River (1999), see A. Dan Tarlock & John E.
Thorson, Coordinating Land and Water Use in the San Pedro River Basin: What Role for the
CEC?, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 4, at 1. The most recent Article 13 report, entitled
Environmental Challenges and Opportunities of the Evolving North American Electricity Market
(June 2002), involved energy issues in North America. The first Article 13 report focused on the
Silva Reservoir in Mexico, and the unexplained death of approximately 40,000 migratory birds
there. CEC Secretariat, Report on the Death of Migratory Birds at the Silva Reservoir (1995). The
second such report dealt with the long-range transport of air pollution throughout the continent
and was entitled Continental Pollutant Pathways: An Agenda for Cooperation to Address Long-
Range Transport of Air Pollution in North America (1997). The Secretariat is currently
undertaking an Article 13 initiative that involves the impacts of genetically modified maize on
native maize strains in Mexico.
37. NAAEC Arts 14-15. See generally Markell, supra note 16, at 568-574. Some
commentators have characterized the citizen submissions process as the "centerpiece" of the CEC
and as its most important feature. See, e.g., Chris Wold, International Environmental Law Project
(1ELP), Comments on Issues Relating to Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (Oct. 2, 2003), in Environmental Law Institute Research Report,
ISSUES RELATING TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Environmental Law Institute
Research Report]; Letter from Paul S. Kibel to Gustavo Alanis-Ortega & Manon Pepin (Sept. 8,
2003), in Environmental Law Institute Research Report.
38. See Knox, supra note 18, at 372-75; see also Raustiala, supra note 19, at 395-398.
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submissions process, carries particular potential significance because
the signatory Parties are the "targets" of this submissions process.39
39. In addition to its authority and responsibilities under Articles 13, 14, and 15, the
Secretariat has significant programmatic responsibilities, including responsibility for the
development of proposed program plans and budgets, and the implementation of the approved
programs. For a review of some of the CEC Secretariat's programmatic initiatives, see GREENING
NAFTA, supra note 4, at chapters 2-4. While some have characterized the NAAEC and NAALC
as "side agreements" to NAFTA, others have urged that they are far more than that, and instead
represent important steps toward bolstering environmental and labor governance and protection in
their own right. One evaluation of the Environmental Agreement, for example, observed that "it is
important to see the NAAEC as a complete agreement in its own right, and not just as a 'side
agreement' to a trade deal.... :
[T]he NAAEC is not just a trade and environment agreement .... Rather, the mandate
of the CEC ...is more broadly defined as the protection and enhancement of the
environment in North America... The long term value of the CEC will be measured
by its fulfil[l]ment of this mandate.
IRC Report at vii.
The broad scope that the NAAEC establishes for the operations of the CEC itself is
another innovative feature of the Agreement. The signatory countries might have set a modest
agenda for the CEC, the first regional environmental institution in North America. But in many
ways they did not. Instead, in several respects in creating this new institution the countries gave it
a broad, virtually unlimited mandate. As John Knox and I have suggested elsewhere, the CEC is
the "first regional environmental organization in North America, with broad mandates to address
almost any environmental issue arising anywhere on the continent." GREENING NAFTA, supra
note 4, at 10. Thus, the NAAEC includes a long list of issues involving environmental protection
that it empowered the newly-constituted CEC to tackle, ranging from "natural resource-type
work" such as protection of endangered species; to pollution control-related issues such as
promoting pollution prevention and emergency response preparedness and response activities; to
environmental reporting; to market-based approaches such as eco-labeling; and including issues
relating to environmental compliance and enforcement. NAAEC, Art. 10, sec. 2. Reflecting the
breadth of the charge the countries gave to the CEC is their decision to empower the CEC also to
consider "other matters as it may decide." Id. The CEC has three main roles: 1) as an institution
that facilitates citizen involvement in international policy making; 2) as a mechanism to address
trade/environment issues; and 3) as a regional environmental organization. GREENING NAFTA,
supra note 4. The primary focus of the four articles in this issue is on the former two aspects of
the CEC, its role as an institution that facilitates citizen involvement in international policy
making, and its role as a mechanism to address trade/environment issues.
The broad discretion of the CEC to act is limited by the size of the CEC and the
resources it is provided to do its work. The CEC's entire annual budget is $9 million. EPA
Budget Authority, EPA Budget Division, at http://www.epa.gov/history/org/resources/
budget.htm (last visited May 4, 2004). This is obviously a very limited sum to take on the
environmental challenges of North America in a meaningful way. This is clear from a quick
comparison with EPA's annual budget. In fiscal year 1994, EPA's budget (not including the
environmental protection budgets of the fifty states) was $6.6 billion. Id. By 2003 EPA's budget
had grown to $7.6 billion. EPA's number of employees similarly dwarfs the CEC's. As of May
2004, the CEC had well under 100 employees, while there were 17,280 EPA employees in 1993
and 17,648 such employees in 2003. Id. Compounding the CEC's financial constraints is the fact
that its budget has remained at the $9 million level since the Commission's inception a decade
ago, despite periodic efforts, primarily by the United States, to increase it. Thus, in real dollar
terms the Commission's resources actually have declined substantially. The CEC's budgetary
constraints obviously were of considerable importance in terms of the strategic choices available
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 26:341
Finally, in addition to establishing JPAC as an internal voice for
the North American public, the Agreement, through its creation of the
citizen submissions process, also creates a significant role for the public
by allowing the public to trigger the process and to contribute
information to it.40 As Professor Raustiala suggests, 41 this has important
implications for the effectiveness and legitimacy of the monitoring and
spotlighting function the process is intended to serve.42
III. THE CEC EXPERIENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC
The institutional structure of the CEC, discussed in Part II above,
raises important questions about public participation in international as
well as domestic environmental governance. Three of the articles in this
issue, those by Professors Knox, Raustiala, and Wold, address several
of these questions.43
In his article, Separated at Birth: The North American
Commissions on Labor and the Environment," Professor John Knox
concludes that the Environmental and Labor Agreements are part of an
evolution from a "Westphalian world. '45 He characterizes this world to
be one that takes as a fundamental precept that international law should
not concern itself with domestic government, and that national
governments are the only legitimate actors on the international stage.46
He suggests that tle NAAEC in particular is two steps away from
Westphalia.47 It recognizes and supports what he characterizes as liberal
democratic values in domestic governance, such as the provision in the
NAAEC that requires the domestic governments of each of the
signatory Parties to provide individuals access to their domestic
to it to take on different environmental protection challenges, and in terms of the strategic choices
for taking on such challenges. For example, a common refrain from CEC personnel has involved
the importance of pursuing collaborations that would enable the CEC to leverage its limited
resources if it hoped to accomplish much of import in enhancing North America's environment.
Janine Ferretti, Speech: Innovations in Managing Globalization: Lessons from the North
American Experience, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 367, 377-78 (2003).
40. NAAEC Arts. 14, 15.
41. Raustiala, supra note 19, at 397-398.
42. Id.
43. See Knox, supra note 18; see also Raustiala, supra note 19 and Wold, supra note 20.
44. Knox, supra note 18.
45. Id. at 359-60. Professor Knox explains that the phrase "Westphalian" is derived from the
Treaty of Westphalia, adopted in 1648, which established a model of international relations that is
state-centered. Id. at 360.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 362-66.
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courts.4 8 It also offers NGOs a role at the international level.49
Concerning the latter, Professor Knox points in particular to two of the
features of the CEC's structure described in Part I, notably the NAAEC's
creation of the JPAC, and its citizen submissions process. 50 He notes
that the JPAC has significant autonomy, including the ability of JPAC
members to elect their own chair and to call their own meetings.5'
Perhaps most significantly, JPAC has the authority to "provide advice to
the Council on any matter within the scope of [the NAAEC] .... 52
Professor Knox cites the citizen submissions process as a CEC
mechanism that allows NGOs to "participate in monitoring the Parties'
implementation of their commitments under the [NAAEC], especially
their obligation to effectively enforce their environmental laws.
53
Professor Knox offers two primary conclusions based on the
experience of the CEC and CLC. First, he concludes that
public participation may be more important to the success of an
international institution than the theoretical possibility of
government-triggered sanctions for failure to comply. In the areas of
labor and environment, governments will rarely if ever bring claims
against one another. Procedures that depend on such claims are
worse than useless, no matter how apparently strong their sanctions,
since they distract attention from more effective compliance
mechanisms and opportunities for cooperation.
54
As a result, he recommends that in future negotiations, labor and
environmental NGOs pursue approaches based on the CEC model that
create opportunities for public participation. He suggests that this model
is
far more likely than the chimera of government-triggered sanctions
to induce governments to enforce high labor and environmental
standards. Governments are increasingly willing to provide for such
Westphalian sanctions, secure in the knowledge that they will never
48. Id. at 366. For a discussion of the term "democracy," see Steven G. Gey, The
Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PENN. L. REv. 801, 879 (1993).
49. Knox, supra note 18, at 362. Professor Knox suggests that the Labor Agreement
represents one step away from Westphalia because the Agreement supports what he characterizes
to be liberal democratic values in domestic governance (such as the provision in the NAALC that
requires the domestic governments of each of the signatory Parties to provide individuals access
to their domestic courts). Id. at 366.
50. Id. at 369-75.
51. Id. at 371.
52. NAAEC Art. 16.
53. Knox, supra note 18, at 372-73.
54. Id. at 386.
2004]
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be triggered. Meanwhile, labor and environmental advocates are
missing opportunities to extend the far more useful post-Westphalian
procedures pioneered by the CEC.5 5
Next, Professor Knox speculates that "[i]t seems probable that the
relative success of the CEC procedure is largely due to its
administration by an independent secretariat and its oversight by an
international advisory committee, which have supported it against
governments' attempts to undermine it."56 He therefore highlights the
importance of building in institutional support for public participation if
such participation is a goal:
[T]he battle to ensure effective public participation in an
international institution does not end when public participation
mechanisms are included in the institution; rather, it is just
beginning. Governments that agree to submissions procedures only
reluctantly, under the pressure of temporary public attention, may be
expected to look for ways to undermine them after they begin to
operate, especially when the procedures threaten to embarrass the
governments. Therefore, institutional support for the procedures,
such as an independent secretariat and a committee of experts that
can serve as a watchdog over the process, is critically important to
their success.
57
Professor Kal Raustiala's article, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in
the NAAEC,58 similarly suggests that including opportunities for citizen
involvement has potential as an element of treaty design. Professor
Raustiala focuses his review on the CEC citizen submissions process.
Professor Raustiala characterizes the process as a "fire alarm" type of
"review institution" in that it provides for review of the countries'
commitments to enforce their environmental laws effectively by
"empower[ing] private actors to bring forward claims about state
performance. ... 59 Professor Raustiala contrasts this "fire alarm"
approach with "police patrols," which he describes as review
mechanisms that permit a central authority to "inspect and review state
performance.... ,60
55. Id. at 387.
56. Id. at 386.
57. Id. at 386-87.
58. Raustiala, supra note 19, at 389.
59. Id. at 393-94.
60. Id. Professor Raustiala draws the distinction between "fire alarms" and "police patrols"
from the domestic political science literature. Id.
[Vol. 26:341
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Professor Raustiala concludes that a fire alarm approach has
important benefits. In particular, he suggests that such an approach may
be more effective and efficient than a "pure police patrol system"
because, inter alia, fire alarm approaches "shift search costs away from
governments and international organizations to individuals and other
private actors"61 and facilitate use of the "abundant private information
about environmental enforcement that individuals possess. ' 62 Professor
Raustiala also suggests that a fire alarm model "upholds ... normative
values concerning participatory democracy" because it directly involves
individuals.63 Furthermore, with respect to the citizen submissions
process in particular, by enhancing public participation, the process may
"enhance the legitimacy of the NAAEC.... ,,64
Professor Raustiala suggests that the use of fire alarms such as the
CEC process is unusual despite their potential benefits, noting that
international law "rarely permits private actors to challenge states. 65 He
reasons that "fire alarms are often shunned, seemingly because by
empowering private actors they threaten state sovereignty and have the
potential to embarrass governments sufficiently to offset the gains in
compliance., 66 Echoing a point that Professor Knox makes, Professor
Raustiala suggests that "[b]y creating a direct role for individuals, the
submissions process challenges the state-centric orientation and
sovereignty focus of international law."
67
Professor Raustiala posits that the potential benefits of fire alarm
approaches may persuade countries to overcome their apprehensions
about them. He suggests that in the future, states increasingly may
employ fire alarms as they learn more about what works best, and as
impediments to creation of such mechanisms (notably, concerns about
loss of sovereignty) diminish.68 Professor Raustiala concludes that while
some have criticized the CEC citizen submissions process for its
61. Id.
62. Id. at 392.
63. Raustiala, supra note 19, at 392.
64. Id. at 409.
65. Id. at 390-91.
66. Id. at 394.
67. Id. at 392.
68. Professor Raustiala also reviews shortcomings in "fire alarm" approaches, including
problems with the CEC's variation of such an approach (e.g., they may "skew" allocation of
resources by government by "promot[ing] goals that are not in the collective interest of the
broader cooperative community" or by yielding over or under enforcement). Raustiala, supra note
19, at 410.
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weaknesses (e.g., its lack of sanctions),69 the process, "when viewed
against the backdrop of other international environmental treaties ... by
further involving private actors in public regulation, represents an
innovative step in the design of international institutions.
70
The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14 &
15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,7 1
co-authored by Professor Chris Wold, the principal author of the
Migratory Birds submission,72 offers important insights concerning the
views of the ENGO community about the operation of the CEC and its
citizen submissions process. As its title suggests, Professor Wold's
article is far from a sugar-coated take on the CEC process. He appears
to be less sanguine than either Professor Knox or Professor Raustiala
about prospects for the process. While Professor Knox suggests that
building institutional support for a complaint-driven accountability
process, such as an independent secretariat and a committee of JPAC-
like experts that can serve as a watchdog over the process, is critically
important to the success of such a process, 73 and while Professor
Raustiala focuses on the innovative nature of the process and its
potential to add efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy to treaty
review, 74 Professor Wold appears to be skeptical that even the
"watchdog" measures that Professor Knox alludes to or the benefits that
Professor Raustiala identifies will turn out to be enough to protect the
process from the tendency of governments to undermine it.
Professor Wold begins by -highlighting, among other things, the
NAAEC's goal of encouraging public participation in environmental
governance as a strategy to enhance environmental protection and its
creation of innovative mechanisms such as the citizen submissions
process as strategies to achieve this goal. He indicates that some
ENGOs had high hopes for the citizen submissions process.75 In fact,
some viewed it as a "potential model for accountability and
governance," as a "positive response to globalization that gives citizens
a voice in the often impenetrable affairs of international
organizations. 
7 6
69. Id. at 397, 413.
70. Id.
71. Wold, supra note 20, at 415.
72. Id. This Submission, filed with the CEC in November 1999, is referred to as SEM-99-
002. The CEC issued a factual record for this submission in April 2003. See www.cec.org.
73. Knox, supra note 18, at 360.
74. Raustiala, supra note 19, at 392.
75. Wold, supra note 20, at 416.
76. Id.
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Professor Wold suggests that citizen enthusiasm for the
submissions process has "waned" significantly in recent years, and that
support for the process in the United States currently is quite low. 77 He
attributes this souring of citizens' views primarily to the decisions of the
CEC Council. In Professor Wold's view, the Council's decisions
concerning the process have "eroded public confidence, 78 in the
mechanism in several ways. First, the Council has reduced the
independence of the CEC Secretariat.7 9 Second, the Council has
"ignored" the criticisms and advice of JPAC, the National Advisory
Committees (NACs) that the countries constituted as domestic advice-
giving bodies,80 and of interested citizens.8' Third, countries have
treated the process as an adversarial rather than cooperative one.
82
Fourth, Professor Wold criticizes the substantive decisions the Council
has reached, including its decisions not to allow factual records
concerning patterns of ineffective enforcement; and its decision that a
submission was not acceptable because it lacked sufficient information
to support development of a factual record (a decision that Professor
Wold claims is for the Secretariat alone to make).8 3
Professor Wold suggests that, in addition to actions by the CEC
Council that have undermined the credibility and value of the citizen
submissions process, countries in their individual capacities have been
obstructionist as well, and thereby jeopardized environmental benefits
from the process. Professor Wold points to his experience with the
United States on the Migratory Birds submission as illustrative. 84 He
suggests that, despite the significant environmental concerns that were
the subject of the submission and the submitters' suggested strategies for
addressing these concerns, the United States "never sought to engage
submitters in a constructive dialogue about solutions to a vast failure to
enforce an important environmental law., 85 Professor Wold similarly
points to what he characterizes as "sham administrative actions" that
Canada initiated in order to undermine a submission that alleged failure
to enforce various environmental laws that govern mining operations.
8 6
77. Id. at 416-17.
78. Id. at 417.
79. Wold, supra note 20, at 417.
80. Id.; NAAEC Art. 17.
81. Wold, supra note 20, at 417.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 423.
84. Id. at 431.
85. Id. at 433.
86. Wold, supra note 20, at 435.
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Having discussed the early high hopes that citizens had for the
citizen submissions process, and the marked loss of citizen confidence
in the process because of frustration concerning its implementation,
particularly by the CEC Council, over the past decade, Professor Wold
offers a series of recommendations for improving the citizen
submissions process that he believes would help to restore public
confidence. First, and in his view "[m]ost important," the Council "must
relinquish its grip on the Citizen Submission Process."87 That is, among
other things, the Council must give the Secretariat greater autonomy to
perform its functions under the process. 88 Second, Professor Wold
suggests that Parties need to serve their function as "stewards" of the
NAAEC and treat the citizen submissions process as the "collaborative
process the drafters intended."89 Third, creating a monitoring capacity to
evaluate follow-up to the issuance of factual records (the end point of
the citizen submissions process) is likely to prove beneficial in realizing
the NAAEC's objective of improving enforcement policies and
practices. 90 Professor Wold concludes by noting that the Council
"certainly knows what it must do to restore public confidence in the
process and to ensure its effectiveness," notably that it "must release its
grip on the process and embrace the NAAEC's cooperative spirit."91 The
outstanding issue, in his view, is whether the Council has the "political
will" to do so.9
2
IV. INSIGHTS FROM THE CEC EXPERIENCE CONCERNING THE
TRADE/ENVIRONMENT INTERFACE
Professor Greg Block's article, The North American Commission
for Environmental Cooperation and the Environmental Effects of
NAFTA: A Decade of Lessons Learned and Where They Leave Us, 93
focuses on the impacts of trade on the environment, a concern that was
an important driving force for the creation of the Environmental
Agreement 94 and that remains a significant issue today.95 Professor
87. Id. at 440.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 441.
90. Id. at 442.
91. Wold, supra note 20, at 442.
92. Id.
93. Block, supra note 22, at 445.
94. NAAEC Article 10:6(d) requires the CEC to "consider[ I on an ongoing basis the
environmental effects of the NAFTA." Professor Block includes a short review of the theoretical
literature concerning the supposed benefits and costs of free trade (e.g., on the plus side, it will
produce welfare gains that will ultimately promote enhanced levels of environmental protection,
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Block's take on this issue is of the "half empty, half full" variety.
Professor Block is relatively positive about the CEC's efforts to develop
and implement methodological approaches for examining the impacts of
trade on the environment.96 He notes, for example, that "increasingly the
work of the CEC in this area has begun to yield real world policy results
and to stimulate others outside the institution to pursue related research
and analysis." 97 He also is supportive of the inclusive approach the CEC
has followed in assessing the effects of trade and suggests that the CEC
has provided meaningful opportunities in this arena that others
interested in fostering public engagement might consider as a possible
model (a theme that Professor Knox covers with respect to the CEC's
submissions process and its inclusion of JPAC as an integral part of the
CEC's structure). 98 Concerning this latter point, Professor Block
suggests that the CEC has helped to "'democratize' trade and
environment impact assessment work by making the work accessible." 99
On the other hand, Professor Block is less than optimistic on
several fronts. First, even with respect to the assessment work
referenced in the preceding paragraph, he notes that the "scale of the
work has been quite modest... and many relevant stakeholders remain
unaware of the CEC's efforts. . . ."'00 He also paints a pessimistic
picture of the actual use of the CEC's work involving trade impacts on
the environment to shape more recently adopted trade agreements,01
concluding that "[p]aradoxically, the "big-picture" issues revealed by
[the CEC's body of trade/environment work] does not appear to be
influencing the content of recent trade agreements in any appreciable
way."'
102
lead to greater efficiencies in resource allocation, and accelerate technological advances and, on
the down side, free trade will cause increased adverse environmental effects because of increased
exploitation of natural resources, and increased levels of pollution, due to "scale," "composition,"
and "race-to-the-bottom" effects). See, e.g., Block, supra note 22, at 450-51.
95. Id. at 464.
96. As Professor Block notes, much of this work, though not all of it, has been undertaken
under the auspices of the CEC's Trade and Environment Program, now called "Environment,
Economy and Trade." Professor Block notes the limitations in the CEC's work to date and also
highlights some of the difficulties in assessing the impacts of trade given the numerous other
factors that can affect economic and environmental conditions. Id. at 448-52.
97. Professor Block qualifies his generally positive view of the methodological process by
noting a variety of deficiencies in this area as well, such as the "modest scope" of the CEC's
efforts and limits in its follow-up. Id. at 446.
98. Id.; Knox, supra note 18, at 3 70-85.
99. Block, supra note 22, at 461.
100. Id.
101. Id. at445.
102. Id.
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Professor Block suggests that lessons from the CEC research and
complementary efforts ought to inform future trade/ environment
negotiations such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
discussions. In particular he argues that one of the lessons is that
increased trade may have scale and other effects that should lead
societies to increase their commitment to the "nuts-and-bolts
infrastructure" of environmental policy implementation. 10 3 He also
suggests that "[t]he clear trend towards convergence of trade,
investment and competition policies in major sectors liberalized in
NAFTA has yet to trigger parallel efforts to harmonize environmental
policies and standards in these same areas."'10 4 He urges progress
towards upwards harmonization in the environmental policy arena,
noting one area in particular in which this has occurred, notably
Canada's making its hazardous waste disposal restrictions as stringent as
those in the United States.1"5
V. CONCLUSION
The number of international agreements and institutions has
climbed dramatically in recent years. The NAAEC and NAALC, and
the CEC and CLC, are part of this phenomenon. As this article and
several others in this volume reflect, the NAAEC and CEC in particular
are innovative in the ways in which they depart from Westphalian
notions of international governance and cede important roles and
responsibilities to NGOs and to a quasi-independent Secretariat. These
innovations situate the CEC as a form of what Professor Lester Salamon
has termed the "new governance," that is, a form of governance that
relies on collaborative problem-solving rather than relying primarily or
exclusively on government capacity and performance.
0 6
Principles of adaptive management, 0 7 as well as common sense,
suggest that we would be well-served by studying the performance of
103. Id. at 452. Professor Block defines "scale" effects to be the potentially adverse
environmental effects resulting from increased economic activity generated by greater levels of
trade, especially through increased inputs from natural resources and increased emissions arising
from the production of goods and services. Id. at 450
104. Block, supra note 22, at 457.
105. Id. at462.
106. LESTER SALAMON, THE NEW GOVERNANCE AND THE TOOLS OF PUBLIC ACTION: AN
INTRODUCTION, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester
M. Salamon, ed., 2002).
107. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 402-03
(2002). (supporting an "adaptive management framework" that relies on "iterative cycles of goal
determination, performance standard setting, outcome monitoring, and standard recalibration" or,
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these new forms of governance. The experience of the CEC over the
past decade provides much fertile ground for such study. Hopefully the
articles in this issue will make a contribution to this important
enterprise.
put another way, "put[s] a premium on collecting information, establishing measurements of
success, monitoring outcomes, using new information to adjust existing approaches, and a
willingness to change.").
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